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# West Europe Report

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## CONTENTS

## THEATER FORCES

## ITALY

- Air Force Gets First Italian-Made 'Tornado'  
(Antonio Mura; IL GIORNALE NUOVO, 1 May 81) ..... 1

## TERRORISM

## FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

- Background, Possible Links to Karry Assassination  
(DER SPIEGEL, 18 May 81) ..... 4

## ECONOMIC

## FINLAND

- Finance Minister on Investment Plans in Parliament Speech  
(HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 6 May 81) ..... 8
- Debt to Soviet Union Decreases, New Shipments Possible  
(HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 6 May 81) ..... 11

## ICELAND

- Price Freeze Hurts Domestic Manufacturers  
(MORGUNBLADID, 26 Apr 81) ..... 12
- Briefs  
Purchasing Power Declines ..... 13  
Government Debt Rises ..... 13

## POLITICAL

### FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Disagreements Within CDU/CSU on Strategy (DER SPIEGEL, 18 May 81) .....	14
--	----

### GREECE

Declaration by Radical Movement Party Published (ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS, 7 May 81) .....	17
ND Party Concerned Over 'Averof Enigma' (ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS, 7 May 81) .....	19
Papandreou Present Foreign Policy Line Analyzed (Editorial; I KATHIMERINI, 9 May 81) .....	21

## GENERAL

### CYPRUS

EDEK, FLN Joint Communique Published (TA NEA, 9 May 81) .....	23
--	----

### FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Berlin, Beijing Universities Sign Cooperation Pact (DER TAGESSPIEGEL, 16 May 81) .....	28
---	----

### GREECE

Present Labor Movement Status Analyzed (And. Ergatikos; ANDI, 8 May 81) .....	30
--	----

## AIR FORCE GETS FIRST ITALIAN-MADE 'TORNADO'

Milano IL GIORNALE NUOVO in Italian 1 May 81 p 19

[Article by Antonio Mura: "'Active' Defense With Tornado"]

[Text] In the past few days, a menacing and propaganda-laden attack by PRAVDA against our country's "aggressive" military policy and against the increase in our military budget occurred, aiming in particular at the Air Force's receiving the first "Tornado" jet aircraft built in Italy.

The aircraft's characteristics are well known: maximum speed of 2,400 kmh, twice that of sound; range of 1,000 kilometers, depending on ceiling, payload and configuration; capability of reaching an altitude of 12,000 meters extremely rapidly, but also able to fly at heights of 100 meters to avoid hostile radar and missiles. It is armed with two 27-mm cannons and a wide array of bombs, rockets and missiles, capable of hitting targets at night or in poor visibility; state-of-the-art avionics with multi-purpose radar, inertial navigation, heads up display, automatic fire and weapons systems control; on-board computers to solve navigation and firing problems; "fly by wire" system of electronic commands, which specifies for each trim, load and velocity the best travel of the command surfaces so as to maximize aerodynamic efficiency; variable sweep-wing design which allows take-offs and landings at speeds of no more than 200 kmh on runways 1,000 meters long so as to avoid dependence on large vulnerable bases; two crew members: pilot and operator for the control navigation and fire control systems.

The aircraft was designed and built in Europe by a three-country consortium: the Federal Republic of Germany [FRG], the United Kingdom [UK] and Italy, forming the Panavia Company, whose main national components are Messerschmitt, British Aerospace and Aeritalia. It is equipped with two Rolls Royce RB 199 turbofan jet engines which develop a thrust of 8,000 kilos using afterburners. The engines are built under license by all three countries. In Italy they are built by FIAT Aviazione.

It is a multi-role aircraft, however, only the UK will produce it in two versions: air defense interceptor and strike fighter-bomber, for a total of 385 aircraft; while Italy and the FRG will build the strike version only, for totals of 100 and 324 respectively. The program calls for building 809 aircraft. Hopefully, there may be additional orders from countries interested in the Tornado.

The limited number of Italian aircraft is due to budgetary reasons. The number of aircraft could not be further reduced without forcing the cancellation of the construction of a valuable assembly plant, and Aeritalia would have had to limit its production to the manufacture of parts to be assembled elsewhere.

The program's cost and the unit-cost of the aircraft are difficult to pinpoint due to the complexity of the factors which determine them: it will be, in any case, very high because of the advanced technology called for and because it includes research and development costs as well as those stemming from international coproduction. In very general terms, referring to analogous aircraft, one can expect the cost of 20 billion lire, which is less than other comparable aircraft.

Was it really necessary for our country to take on a program involving such a commitment and equip our Air Force with such aircraft? One may answer this by making clear a fundamental point: does our country wish to remain in the company of modern, industrialized countries, able to produce advanced technological products and be an active participant in a military alliance? Or, while participating in a defensive accord, putting the brunt of the undertaking on others' shoulders? The answer, without a doubt, is that the Tornado or an aircraft with similar performance is indispensable because an aircraft with lesser capabilities would be unable to carry out its mission in an environment where extremely advanced weapons systems are being used.

The choice of a combat aircraft took place with an eye on the number in existence and being manufactured in the rest of the world as well as analyzing the qualitative levels of a potential enemy's weapons: a fighter-bomber not capable of flying in an all-weather status below 100 meters at high speeds in a zone of high electronic countermeasure activity will never reach its target because it will be tracked and intercepted beforehand. A raider not possessing state-of-the-art equipment could not even run the risk of approaching a hostile zone. An air force, small though it may be, must be equipped with the best the world has to offer, or it will be useless.

At this point, the assertion is usually made that it is sufficient for a country, such as Italy, which harbors no aggressive designs against anyone but wishes merely to defend itself against foreign aggression, to deploy means of defense such as a radar network, surface-to-air missiles and interceptors in order to interdict enemy aircraft from flying over Italian airspace. One who asserts the above, however, does not indicate that whatever the system of defense, no matter how advanced it is, it will not be capable of stopping all hostile aircraft, which are capable of hitting their targets in very large numbers, by jamming all the radars and attacking at very low altitudes. The penetration fighter bomber, an offensive aircraft par excellence, in effect is the first and most important means of defense, because its targets are enemy aircraft and their bases; only if it can hit the enemy air force on the ground or be able to neutralize its bases, will it be capable of reducing its strike capability.

The Tornado basically has this task: its characteristics and flight capabilities allow it to be not intercepted and swoop down on enemy bases pinning the enemy air force on the ground, to hit the air defense systems, the radars, control centers and telecommunications setups. Its armament, designed to damage runways, shelters and storage tanks permits the reduction or temporary annulment of the enemy's air force strike capability and at least partially knock it out of the picture.

This tactical and technical consideration, however, does not take into account all the potential benefits that can be accrued with the expenditures for 100 Tornado fighter bombers such as social productive and incentive investments, jobs, company start-ups and stimulation. It is, therefore, useful to examine some of these essential points.

The task of building, designing and producing machines of that caliber is possible only in those countries which enjoy a very advanced industrial base in all those sectors linked with aircraft design and technology, from working with special materials and alloys to supersonic aerodynamics, highly sophisticated electronics and highly complex, sensitive instruments.

The commitment and the extremely high specialization needed by an industrialized country in order to join and remain in such advanced and leading sectors constitute an exceptional dynamic aimed at reaching and maintaining a position of prestige and continuous improvement in the industry's most advanced sector. This translates into sophisticated work for hundreds of highly specialized firms, tens of thousands of skilled workers, technicians, designers, researchers and millions of work-hours for many years.

9209

CSO: 3104/258



## BACKGROUND, POSSIBLE LINKS TO KARRY ASSASSINATION

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 18 May 81 pp 120-121

[Text] It seemed plausible to experts in the Federal Criminal Police Bureau [BKA] that the murder of the Hessian minister, Heinz Herbert Karry, was "part of a series."

Hesse's minister for economics and technology, Heinz Herbert Karry, 61, was worried about his sleep. After a week's trip through Spanish provinces with visits to the military and to mayors, he remembered "the constant phone calls at home." The FDP politician, who likes to chat in Frankfurter dialect, remembered that someone had called last Thursday night. "He didn't say anything, I just heard him breathe."

The Free Democrat said he didn't want to get a private number, "because people have to get hold of me." Nor did the minister think much of catching the caller with a phone trace: "That's no good." He also refused expensive protection and personal bodyguards all around. "That just costs money," the federal treasurer of the FDP argued on board the DC 9, "Just think what I save the government."

Four days later, on Monday of last week, at exactly 5 o'clock, in the twilight, figures with a step-ladder, a flashlight, and a "High Standard" pistol crept into Karry's property in 51 Hofhaus-Strasse in Frankfurt-Seckbach, and softly pushed open the lattice-work window that was slightly ajar.

Seconds later, at 5:02, two shots, two shots whipped over the heads of the sleeping couple. "What's going on?" Karry said as he jumped up and staggered toward the window. Hit by four more shots, the minister collapsed next to the bed. At 6:25 an emergency doctor declared him dead.

For the first time in the FRG a leading politician had been murdered. This seemed to be a new dimension of terrorism. It was definitely an act that at first did not seem to fit the pattern of previous acts of terrorism that had been committed either by leftist extremists or radical rightists. And while at the end of last week the detectives still could only speculate about what group to assign the assassins to, politicians and security officials both seriously considered the question of whether Karry would still be alive if he had only been better protected.



The federal government and the Laender spend almost 300 million marks to protect their top politicians; the BKA has its own "Security Squad" in Bonn for this purpose. The states use their roving special troops as well as local ones. For example, between 1,200 and 1,400 of the approximately 23,000 police in Baden-Wuerttemberg are assigned in three-shift duty to the protection of life and property.

The politicians are divided into three danger groups according to their rank and duty: in group 1, according to "Police Regulation 100," there is constant escort and property protection. Group 2 calls for escort in special situations and at special times. Group 3 calls for patrols and sporadic protection.

But what for some is a status symbol is a bother to others. In Bavaria and in Baden-Wuerttemberg, for example, the ministers place more importance on escort than they do in Hesse. "We don't think much of protection," a Wiesbaden interior minister said. "But now, after what happened to Karry, we will have to change our ideas a little."

There is no doubt that the basic conviction is still there: attacks cannot be stopped even with the most expensive protective apparatus, not to speak of the respectable position of politicians like Karry, who consider the protection both senseless and unpleasant.

The murdered minister always had fewer bodyguards around him than he was allowed. He didn't tolerate them at home at all because "I don't want to lock myself in." He also wondered "who would do anything to me, I don't do anything to anyone, after all." Hesse's minister of the interior, Ekkehard Gries, said that he only had "political opponents," but "no enemies." But there were also hostile attitudes toward Karry, above all in recent months.

As a responsible minister of his department, he handled projects such as autobahn construction, the west takeoff runway at the Frankfurt airport, Block C of the Biblis nuclear plant, and the planned reprocessing plant. He was pushing this work forward, and he was strongly criticized by construction opponents. The minister was burned in effigy, and the police intercepted a radio broadcast with the demand: "The bum has got to be exterminated."

But according to a police official, "Lots of people have to live" with threats like that. The confessions, too, that appeared after the attack, were relegated by the police to the ranks of the "runningboard drivers." In the HANAUER ANZEIGER, one of them said, "Here is the ROE--revenge of the environmentalists--we killed Karry." The "RAF" called up Karry's house: "This was the first blow."

The Frankfurt ABENDPOST-NACHTAUSGABE reported one caller who claimed that he and his son murdered the minister because "he took away our property for urban renewal." In BILD, a "Third Reich Movement" claimed responsibility for the murder of the minister, who was of Jewish descent.

Nor was it clear what happened last week in the early morning hours in front of the Hessian economics minister's house. Mrs Karry received another mysterious call at 1 o'clock Monday morning in which only breathing could be heard. She left the

receiver off the hook to avoid further disturbances. At 2:30, in accordance with security regulations, a radio patrol car came by and parked in front of the house for 15 minutes. At 4:35 the police were also nearby. According to the police report, patrolmen of the sixth precinct saw "an object about 100 meters" from Karry's villa.

This patrol didn't know that at the latest from 4 o'clock on strange things were seen in front of the minister's house. For example, a newspaper carried noticed a woman under 30 who was walking rapidly away from Karry's property and who got into the driver's seat of a parked red Fiat (F-PD..." or "F-ED..." numbers unknown).

A man about the same age was waiting in the passenger seat. He was also noticed later in Hofhaus-Strasse, obviously watching the Karry house.

It seemed possible to the detectives, according to the discussions in the "Special Karry Commission," that the minister was not supposed to be murdered, but only frightened. Was this the reason for the first shots against the wall? According to this theory, Karry ran into the line of fire and brought the gunman into an uncalculated panic reaction.

A factor that is indicative of such thoughtlessness is that the ladder was left lying under the window. The pistol, too, was thrown away two blocks away. And the fact that Mrs Karry could not report the attack because the line was blocked was not an indication of the cleverness of the attackers. The cause of the blockage was that the receiver had been off the hook for a long time.

The investigators expected definite clues from a check on the gun used in the murder, but it seems to have been going around in criminal circles for a good 10 years now. In the middle of November, 1970, two U.S. soldiers had stolen a total of 17 handguns, including 10 Colts, in the Ayers Caserne in Kirch-Goens in Butzbach. Then gradually, according to a report of the special commission, they passed them on "through middlemen to unknown people in Frankfurt." One of these 17 guns was later to kill Karry.

The case was later taken care of by U.S. military police internally. German police agencies learned very little about the factual background. High-ranked security police remember that members of the American Black Panther Party had systematically supplied weapons for the Revolutionary Cells (RC). Above all, RC activist Wilfried Boese, later involved in the Entebbe highjacking, is said to be the buyer of the Butzbach loot. Security reports say that Boese acted as a weapons supplier both to the German RAF cadres and to the Japanese Red Army Faction.

It is certain that 4 of the 17 weapons ended up in terrorist hands. One pistol was found after an occupation of the French Embassy in Den Haag by Japanese terrorists, a revolver was found with the terrorist Rainer Hochstein, a Colt was discovered in an apartment in Frankfurt used by the RAF, another in a burst open RAF parcel in a Berlin post office.

Among the few clues that the investigators had last week was the analysis of some attacks that show parallels to the Karry murder. Examinations and comparisons of all details were made of the attacks on the union politician, Walter Leisler

Kiep (1974 in Kronberg), the Jewish publisher, Shomo Lewin (1980 in Erlangen) and the Austrian city councillor, Heinz Nittel (1981 in Vienna). None of these cases has been solved.

An unknown person shot at Kiep as the villa owner came out of his sauna into his garden on a Saturday. Before this he had received several threatening calls. Kiep was unharmed. The drift of the calls was, as he remembers, "Palestine and the rights of the Palestinian people. They were against me as a representative of Israel's interests."

Lewin, business head of the Society for Christian-Jewish Cooperation in Franconia, was killed together with his wife in December in Erlangen. Each received four pistol shots. He, too, had received threatening phone calls for months. In his case, too, as the reports show, a woman was the main, or co-assassin. Lewin's cousin, Ari Frankenthal, described the murderers in his funeral oration in this way: "A hired sword."

Heinz Nittel, the Viennese city councillor in traffic and energy, and President of the Austrian-Israeli Society, died on the morning of 1 May in his official car under the fire of a Soviet Makarov pistol (9-millimeter). Weapons of this type had also been used in the murders committed by the international terrorists, "Carlos," and by the RAF gunmen. Nittel's driver, who just escaped the bullets, said, "That was no lunatic."

Ten days later, Heinz Herbert Karry died, a member of the German-Israeli Economic Union. At present, the Special Commission can only speculate as to whether he was the "victim of militant political extremists," as the Hessian state police claim, or whether there was quite a different motive behind the crime. Imitation, for instance. It seemed quite plausible to experts in the BKA that the murder was "part of a series"--"then good night."

9124

CSO: 3103/311

## FINANCE MINISTER ON INVESTMENT PLANS IN PARLIAMENT SPEECH

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 6 May 81 p 9

[Article: "Koivisto Administration Will Launch Economic Recovery Next Year, Contingency Deposits to Be Returned to Business Firms"]

[Text] The Koivisto administration is getting ready for a weakening of economic prospects and a worsening of the unemployment situation at the end of this year and next year. So it will set about reviving the economy like its predecessor did and next year release over 3 million marks in various contingency deposits collected from business firms.

This was the essence of the economic policy report the government made to Parliament on Tuesday, read by Finance Minister Ahti Pekkala (Center Party).

The government promises relief in its monetary policy, is striving to control inflation more effectively than before and is trying to keep the tax level from rising.

Between the lines of the government report it is revealed that taxation known to be due to inflation control measures will perhaps in future not be at a maximal level.

Deposits to Be Released in Three Stages

According to the government announcement, the release of special deposits collected from business firms will take place in three stages: in early October, early January 1982 and early May 1982. The total amount of funds to be returned to these firms will come to over 3.3 billion marks.

Basing its action on the laws governing economic policy, as of 1978 the government has been collecting various export, contingency and investment deposits from business firms. The purpose is to control overspending and even out fluctuations of the economy.

According to Finance Minister Pekkala, the government is trying to support investments and improve the employment situation through the release of special deposits to begin 6 months from now. According to him, the release of these funds will be timed so that the effects they have on employment will be most strongly felt during the winter of 1982-1983 when it is anticipated that the employment situation will be at its worst.



The major portion of these special deposits, nearly 2.9 billion marks, is in the form of investment reserves. According to Pekkala, businesses will be authorized, at the beginning of next October, to use investment reserves deposited at the latest during the fiscal period that ended 31 December 1978. At that time about 235 million marks in reserve funds will be released.

Reserves deposited during the fiscal period that ended in 1979 will be released as of the beginning of next year. These funds amount to 740 million marks all told.

A year from May, reserves deposited during the fiscal period that ended on 31 March 1981, amounting to 1.91 billion marks, will be released. Export deposits collected from the wood-processing industry have accumulated to a total of 200 million marks and they will be returned beginning in January. The collecting of contingency deposits from firms will end at the beginning of next July and the government will start returning the deposits at the end of the year. So far about 240 [million marks] have been debited to these deposits.

#### Housing Construction Tax to Be Eliminated in September

The collection period for levying the investment tax on certain primarily southern Finnish housing construction jobs is to be shortened and the entire tax will be eliminated in gradual local stages by September.

The funds that accumulate through the collection of the 25 to 40-percent housing construction investment tax are deposited in a government contingency fund and, unlike them, other deposits will not be returned.

Pekkala also believes that housing construction projects postponed because of the investment tax will be set in motion in especially large numbers next fall.

Tax reductions on industrial construction investments as well as machinery and equipment investments are in effect for projects begun by the end of this year. According to the report, in future the government promises to take a stand on the handling of the industrial investment tax as soon as possible, at the latest in connection with the drafting of the budget.

#### Reduction of Unemployment Difficult

During the next few years unemployment will be one of our biggest problems. In order to go on reducing unemployment, during the next few years we would clearly have to increase the GNP at a rate of over 3 percent a year, which is hard to do, as they maintain in the report.

Pekkala noted on Tuesday that the overt level of unemployment has not dropped below 4.5 percent even during a period of peak economy. The report predicted that unemployment would easily go to 6 or 7 percent during a lengthy economic low.

Even though the government is preparing for a recession, according to the finance minister it does not expect one as bad as the last slump. It is, however, believed that investments will slightly decline next year as will the volume of industrial operations.

Another major problem is inflation. As it has announced, the government is now striving to control relatively rapid inflation so that a rise in real income may be protected without having to resort to index hikes.

Prevention of a rise in the tax level is also on the government's list of objectives, although assessment of social benefits and pensions will in the long run raise the level of taxes.

According to the government report, the extent to which a rise in the level of taxes can be controlled will essentially depend on how successful we are in limiting the growth of public expenditures. According to Finance Ministry figures, government expenditures may increase by only 2 percentage points a year.

In the opinion of the government, an increase in the foreign debt in the next few years cannot be entirely prevented, but it is setting itself the goal of keeping the debt's share of the GNP from increasing perceptibly.

#### Taxation to Correct Inflation

The report makes no definite promises about taxation to correct inflation. To be sure, it offers a glimmer of hope in the possibility that adjustments would not be in the full amount permissible in future.

Dealing with the matter specifically, the report says the following: "The dimensioning of adjustments on the basis of changes in consumer prices has a drawback: The rise in the cost of imported energy is thus in part compensated for by income tax. In future the government also intends to pay more attention to such matters than it has before."

The government report promises a somewhat slacker monetary policy than usual for next year. The Finance Ministry has discussed the matter with the Bank of Finland and relief has been promised. Among other things, the Bank of Finland will release cash reserve deposits.

Members of Parliament will have an opportunity to voice their opinions on the government report during a plenary session beginning at 1300 hours today, Wednesday. Permissions to take the floor were requested on Tuesday.

11,466  
CSO: 3107/66



## DEBT TO SOVIET UNION DECREASES, NEW SHIPMENTS POSSIBLE

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 6 May 81 p 9

[Article: "Still a USSR Payment Deficit of 240 Million"]

[Text] This spring Finland's debt to the Soviet Union shrank to about 40 million rubles, or to a trade balance deficit of 240 million marks. At the end of the year the balance of payments deficit amounted to nearly 900 million marks.

"If trading goes on in as lively a fashion as it has up to now, by the end of the year Finland may yet be receiving revenue from the Soviet trade," says manager Kari Holopainen of the Bank of Finland's Eastern Trade Division.

Since the beginning of this year trade between Finland and the Soviet Union has reached the 150-million-ruble credit limit.

If accounts receivable or the debt go beyond the credit limit, we will negotiate additional new shipments.

It is also possible that our creditor and trade partner may demand that we make up the payments deficit in the form of freely exchangeable currency, for example, in dollars. However, this has never happened before.

Holopainen feels that trade between the Soviet Union and Finland this year will remain well within the credit limit. Only a big and unexpected jump in the price of oil could precipitate a trade imbalance.

Last year the payments deficit in our trade with the Soviet Union would have at one point come to 300 million rubles, or 1.8 billion marks, but then it began to balance out at the end of the year when Finland received payments for its construction projects.

Payments in the trade between Finland and the Soviet Union are handled through a so-called clearing system, which guarantees balanced trade in the long run. Money is not actually used in trading; rather accounts are kept in the central banks of both countries.

## PRICE FREEZE HURTS DOMESTIC MANUFACTURERS

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 26 Apr 81 p 2

[Article: "Price Freeze Squeezes Businesses: Operational Losses 5 to 9 Percent After This Month"]

[Text] "If the government plans to extend the price freeze, businesses are actually being stabbed in the back. When the laws took effect at the turn of the year, it was clearly stated that this was a time limited measure," said Valur Valsson, executive director of the Federation of Icelandic Manufacturers, in an interview with MORGUNBLADID, when he was asked his opinion on the government's idea to extend the so-called tightened price freeze from the turn of the year."

During this time period, businesses have waited to raise prices, but wages have, for example, increased considerably, first on 1 February and then on 1 May. If the figures that have been mentioned are used as a comparison, the wage cost of the businesses has increased by 15 to 17 percent during this time period, which just by itself tightens their positions extremely.

This situation has lead to the fact that businesses are in general operating at a loss today. After the end of this month the loss will be, as a ratio of the total turnover, 5 to 9 percent on the average. This is based on projected calculations from the National Economic Institute. Actually, this does not tell the whole story, as some of these businesses are worse off than these figures indicate.

Obviously, a serious problem has befallen industry, a problem which must be solved. But that will not be done unless the price freeze is abolished, among other things. "The businesses cannot be run at a loss on a long-term basis; that is only possible for a short period of time," said Valsson.

It came forth that the industrial managers were quite apprehensive about repeated statements by individual authorities in the mass media to the effect that it would be right to extend the price freeze.

1981

ISO: 3111/37

## BRIEFS

**PURCHASING POWER DECLINES**--The purchasing power of the laborers' pay scale is now 17 percent lower than it was in June 1978. The purchasing power then was 118.8 points compared with 100 in 1971 and was still unchanged in December 1978. Now the purchasing power of the same pay scale is estimated at 101.8 points as of 1 May. The purchasing power of the payscale of unskilled female workers has declined about 14.3 percent during the same time period; the purchasing power of shop and office workers has declined about 8.6 percent; the purchasing power of government workers about 16.5 percent and the purchasing power of all wage earners in the country has declined about 14.4 percent during this time. This information came forth in an article written by Gudmundur H. Gardarsson in MORGUNBLADID today and is published on the center page of the paper. Gardarsson demonstrates there that the May law of the government of Geir Hallgrimsson had ensured the greatest purchasing power of the low income groups during the last 3 years. The scale starts to tip for the worse when the so-called "Olafu-law" took effect and the purchasing power dropped drastically so that on 1 December 1980 it was estimated to be 1.8 percent higher than it was 10 years ago, in 1971. The purchasing power of all wage earners is now 2.6 percent higher than it was in 1971. [Text] [Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 6 May 81 p 2] 9583

**GOVERNMENT DEBT RISES**--At the end of March the debt of the national treasury to the Central Bank amounted to 487 million kroner; at the end of last year it was 298 million kroner and was therefore increased by 63.3 percent during this period. This information was received from the Central Bank yesterday. This applies to the A section of the national treasury and at the same time last year, that is the end of March, the debt of the national treasury to the Central Bank amounted to about 357 million kroner. [Text] [Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 30 Apr 81 p 48] 9583

CSO: 3111/37

## DISAGREEMENTS WITHIN CDU/CSU ON STRATEGY

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 18 May 81 pp 34-36

[Article: "More of the Same"]

[Text] Within the CDU/CSU Union, there is disagreement on the best way to come to power. Helmut Kohl and the CSU would love to deport CDU General Secretary Heiner Geissler to Berlin.

The Union Christians in Bonn feel sufficiently upbeat these days for their chief to reopen the opposition's favorite game. Since the Berlin social liberals' defeat CDU chairman Helmut Kohl has started dreaming of the day when he will become chancellor.

According to Kohl's predictions to intimates, the FDP and Hans-Dietrich Genscher will defect to the CDU next year at the latest, following the Landtag elections in Lower Saxony. The Union would not even have to put up a fight; the task of forming a government would accrue to it by default.

Kohl's dream of acceding to power to Bonn without an election victory and with the liberals' help has met with disappointment several times in the past. But this time nobody in the Union leadership felt like openly disputing the chairman's analysis.

The reason: the social-liberal coalition's fall from power, reflected in Berlin by Hans-Jochen Vogel's defeat, has once again made Helmut Kohl the Union's undisputed leader.

Even the CSU admits that, should Helmut Schmidt be ousted prior to the end of the voting period, "Kohl will become our candidate for chancellor, without any argument as to whether we like it or not." However, should the CDU chief have to wait until the 1984 Bundestag elections, he would have to face at least two rivals: Lower Saxony's Ernst Albrecht and Schleswig-Holstein's minister president, Gerhard Stoltenberg.

To begin with, there was silence from those Kohl critics who reproached the leader of the opposition for idly hoping that the government would self-destruct, instead of unseating FRG chancellor Schmidt in parliament. The Union parties' apparent weakness, their inability to formulate concrete alternatives to present government policies, is now being touted by the Christian Democrats as well-planned strategy.

Back in 1974, Franz Josef Strauss had already proposed these guidelines in Sonthofen: the government would have to continue destroying itself; all the opposition had to do was to wait for Helmut Schmidt to tie himself up in his own difficulties without hope of recovery.

The Berlin election results proved to Kohl's party managers a textbook confirmation of two of the Christian Union's basic strategic tenets:

--The opposition is not in a position to unseat the government; the social-liberals would have to forfeit power by themselves;

--There is no way of "buying" the FDP's way out of its coalition with the Social Democrats; rather, it would have to "escape" from it.

As one of Kohl's advisors puts it ironically: "That is why our leaders draw this conclusion from the Berlin results: let us continue as in the past--i.e., do nothing."

What Kohl is trying to hide behind his watch-and-wait strategy is the fact that there is hardly less disagreement within the Union than there is in the coalition. This despite the fact that shortly after the 5 October Bundestag election defeat the FRG's CDU leadership decreed during a secret meeting in Boppard that in future everything would be discussed openly and without fear of controversy. The main reason for this would be to present to frustrated young voters an image of a vital party unafraid to air its opinions.

But every time CDU General Secretary Heiner Geissler tried to put this to the test and tried to stir up an intraparty controversy on such matters as arms exports or a new foreign policy, he was quickly brought up short. Kohl warned that the Union must not commit the mistake of diverting attention from the split in the social-liberal government coalition by engaging in heated debates itself.

Geissler, formerly one of Kohl's loyal subjects, acquiesced. But privately he was stubborn: open discussions, he maintained, on alternative life styles, arms exports and the new peace movement were of "existential significance," if the CDU were to retrieve its lost credibility.

The general secretary does not place much hope in Kohl's expectations of a quick change of direction by the liberals. A frequent show of dependence upon the FDP would only force Geisler's party to make continuous professions of loyalty to the Social Democrats, Geissler thinks.

The CSU shares this opinion. Friedrich Zimmermann, chairman of the CSU Land group in the Bundestag, suggested last week that the Berlin CDU should opt for new elections if the liberals were unwilling to form a coalition. Says Zimmermann about the FDP's plans to isolate a Christian Democrat minority council from the opposition: "This wretched intrigue must not be encouraged; not even for the intermediate term."

The CSU is afraid that its Berlin sister party is becoming a captive of the FDP, which is constantly fighting for its survival and which thus, as a silent partner of the government in power, cannot be trusted. But, thinks Zimmermann, with new elections the CDU could jam the liberals under the 5-percent hurdle and thus gain an absolute majority of seats in the chamber of deputies.



But the CDU chief wanted none of this. An election fight to the death against the FDP would only weld the Free Democrats even more firmly to the SPD--in Bonn as well as in the 1982 Landtag elections in Hesse, Hamburg and Lower Saxony.

The relative electoral success in Berlin will presumably provide the CDU in Bonn with one more personnel action--concerning the job of Heiner Geissler, who vainly proposed new discussion themes to his party.

This is because Norbert Blum is moving to the Berlin Parliament. He had been slated to become senator for labor and social issues, which would have forced in him to give up the chairmanship of the CDU's social committees.

Until now, Kohl had been thinking about Heiner Geissler as Blum's successor. This would have been an elegant way to push the troublesome manager out of headquarters. But Blum refuses to cooperate. He wants to continue as chairman of the Christian Democrat employees' organization without relinquishing his Berlin connection--as Berlin's federal senator stationed in Bonn.

The CSU, which retains an unpleasant memory of Geissler's crossfire against its chairman Franz Josef Strauss, has a good idea of who would be a good choice for labor senator in that case. It recommends that in addition to Blum, Heiner Geissler would make a valuable addition to the Berlin Senat.

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CSO: 3103/314



## DECLARATION BY RADICAL MOVEMENT PARTY PUBLISHED

Athens ELEVTERIOS KOSMOS in Greek 7 May 81 p 3

[Text] The Radical Movement [RM] published yesterday a summary of its declaration. As is known, RM is a political group which was formed in 1980 with former monarch Kon. Pylarinos as its secretary general. He had resigned [as monarch] in the summer of 1978 following a disagreement with the government.

With its declaration, RM underlines that it is inviting to a fighting cooperation all those who felt the ideological repression by the extremist political groups, injustice and humiliation and wish to push aside the incompetent and the crooked. The declaration makes the following points, in part: [There are] symptoms of dissipation and bankruptcy in our political life, and there is danger of seeing the constitution [turned] into a dead letter and a governmental and partisan establishment "full of speculators, bigots, mad-slingers and arrogant men." It should be noted that RM invites everybody "regardless of their political orientation." The full text of the summary of the RM declaration is as follows:

"WHEREAS: Our political life again shows the symptoms of dissipation and bankruptcy--with the consequences clearly visible to a smooth and steady course in the country at this critical juncture facing our geographic area--proving that most of those who participate in public life have learned nothing from the distant and recent past.

"WHEREAS: Our political institutions parade their nonexistence and the constitution of the republic is in danger of becoming a dead letter under the daily blows of the anti-democratic behavior of those in leadership positions; under the indifference of the cabinet members toward the moral and ideological views of the people on whom they depend and whom, behind the scenes, they methodically betray; under their provocative contempt even toward the sound suggestions of the nonpartisan press or the leading members of the legislature; and under the blind fanaticism of a significant number of young people, not for Greece but for the socio-political dogmas, any dogmas at all.

"WHEREAS: Finally in the broader national democratic area, yesterday's and today's renowned leadership with its conscious or unconscious acts and omissions--besides the anti-democratic crime of the dissolution of the Center and the current conspiracies behind the back of the people--has imposed with the aid of the faction

and the interests a governmental and partisan establishment full of speculators, bigots, mud-slingers and arrogant men; full of renegades and apostates of all shades, with the result of having neutralized and turned--even temporarily--hundreds of thousands of followers into 'voters of necessity' and many proud cadres into 'servile petitioners' without any desire to fight and sacrifice, thus offering one more opportunity for [constitutional] deviation and one more alibi for anomaly.

"THEREFORE: In the face of the successive crises which are forthcoming and of the multi-faceted problems, we, with a deep sense of responsibility, start off today from many points in this sacred land for a radical struggle for peace, for the protection of democracy and for the political change. Our effort is accompanied by a special fact. We are not well known through artful techniques, neither are we the chosen of the Athenian elite. We do not have the support of the partisan press, of the partisan syndicalism or of the capitalists. But we are the many, the simple soldiers trying despite a thousand obstacles to express the agony of our country and the demand of the Greeks for a betterment and not a worsening of their lives; to express the standard quest for a democratic, careful and dynamic government of a politically mistreated people. We are not here to offer one more partisan "seal." We are here to serve with decisiveness the radical ideas and the Panhellenic demand for improvement and for peaceful reforms in critical sectors of our national life.

"THEREFORE: We invite to a fighting cooperation all those who felt the exploitation of their life's trial or the ideological pressure by the extremes; all those who felt the injustice or humiliation; all those who--without bigotry and fanaticism, without lawless interests and connections--believe in the "thousand times repeated" change and the democratic normalcy.

"WE INVITE: Greek men and women, in whatever political group they may belong, to a Panhellenic crusade to push aside the incompetent and the crooked who turned politics from a lofty avocation to a profession and the administration to a hotbed of scandal.

"WE CALL: On everyone, regardless of their political orientation, to work within their partisan areas for the selection to elective offices of sound individuals so that sometime we may achieve a pure political life, indispensable for progress and prosperity.

"WE SPECIFICALLY INVITE: All those who believe in our ideas to support the honest and capable cadres of the national democratic area and to walk with us in a joint, dynamic, radical march with the aim of tearing down the incompetence, uprooting corruption and stopping as much as possible the downslide of the political and governmental decay.

"Greek Radicalism is a movement of new men and new ideas and its main mission is to fight for a stronger Greece, with better living conditions and a proud national life."

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C30: 4908/161

## ND PARTY CONCERNED OVER 'AVEROF ENIGMA'

Athens ELEVTERHOS KOSMOS in Greek 7 May 81 pp 1, 10

[Text] The enigmatic statement Defense Minister Ev. Averof made 2 days ago before the New Democracy Party parliamentary group that he has not yet made up his mind whether to run or not in the next elections has caused debates, various reactions and comments among ND circles and among politicians in general. Some people attributed great importance to the Averof statement and spoke about a plan which aims at first at forcing the party under its present leadership--under Rallis, that is, who represents the "mild political climate"--to change the method of attack against its main opponent Andreas Papandreu and his party in view of the [forthcoming] elections.

Others claimed that once more Averof is "bluffing" and that he will finally run but that before he does he would like a "leader's atmosphere" created around him for "any emergency." Both these interpretations of the Averof statement have many supporters especially when considered in conjunction with the Rallis attack against the leader of the major opposition [Papandreu] who is broadly promoted by the state media.

Exactly 1 year after the critical [party] vote from which Rallis barely emerged as the successor of Kon. Karamanlis in the ND leadership, one observes again the phenomenon of the "Averofian group" being realigned in the past 2 days but apparently without its old strength. It does not have 84 deputies, in other words, but considerably fewer. Because he lost the leadership and because of his subsequent inaction, many of his deputies joined the "Rallis group" or that of Akh. Karamanlis.

## What Averof Means Exactly

Specifically commenting on the Averof statement in conjunction with the recent domestic political developments which portray Papandreu as "more moderate" and with other events (NEW YORK TIMES article, etc.), many ND deputies and other political observers were saying the following:

1. Anticipating an ND electoral defeat, Averof is making an effort to disengage himself from the party, his ultimate objective being to avoid any responsibility for the ND policy which since 1974 has succeeded among other things in promoting

Papandreou as a candidate for assuming power. In this way Averof actually takes a step toward withdrawing from the party to avoid the consequences of defeat.

2. Another view and interpretation of his statement is that Averof, aware of the foregoing, is making one last effort: In view of the party's special Panhellenic Congress in June, he would try to impose his views concerning the objectives ND should have if it wished to win the election and also impose his own method for coping with Andreas Papandreou and PASOK, a method contrary to that of the "mild political climate." In the event, however, that he did not prevail he would announce that he would not run in the elections thus saving for himself the alibi that "I told you so but you did not listen to me."

3. Realizing that Rallis cannot as a leader meet the needs of the most difficult electoral struggle of the past 20 years, Averof has started already to create a "leadership atmosphere" hoping for the "unexpected" when he would force even in a special congress the need for a new leader and thus become the new ND leader in accordance with the democratic procedures provided for in the party's charter.

4. Another interpretation of the statement is that Averof decided to "go his own way" against any other political factors and that he is trying to persuade Rallis to go along since he believes that only in this way and with a dynamic confrontation with Papandreou can ND win the election and possibly form a viable government. But in such a case many wonder about the reaction of the other factor for such a "rebellion" which is contrary to the "mild political climate" and to other maneuvers.

5. Deputies loyal to Averof were saying yesterday that in this way the defense "minister" wants to point out that he "is still around" as concerns the former followers of the Radical National Union who did not join "in its transformation" to New Democracy in 1974 but protested through their vote both during the elections of that year and those in 1977. That protest vote had reached 7 percent and it is estimated that today it is considerably higher. These Averof loyalists, however, did not continue with their speculations since evidently no plans exist for a new party of the Right with Averof as its leader.

6. Another interpretation is that Averof as usual is "bluffing," that he is going to do absolutely nothing and finally will accept what will be decided at the congress and will subsequently run for election. He just simply wanted to "show off" and nothing else. Perhaps what he expects of the ND deputies is to have them "implore him" not to desert the party at such a critical moment and thus appear that he accepts their implorings and stays in politics. This last interpretation which is substantiated by Averof circles does not rule out the intention of his statement to the parliamentary group. In any case, political observers say that the whole "Averof affair" is expected to be cleared up by the end of June when his real intentions will be revealed at the ND congress.

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## PAPANDREOU PRESENT FOREIGN POLICY LINE ANALYZED

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 9 May 81 p 7

[Editorial Comment: "Consistency and Responsibilities"]

[Text] We have said [many times as well as] recently that in most countries, at least the more advanced ones, it is necessary to keep foreign policy questions outside partisan strife. Every country's vital interests are not considered suitable subjects for experimentation by any [partisan] camp regardless of how it presents itself as "conservative" or as "progressive."

In Greece, on the contrary, foreign policy has been the most significant area of conflict between the government camp and PASOK which has been the major opposition party during the last few years. Papandreu always used his most acute polemic on the basic points of our foreign policy--Europe, NATO--portraying the government as almost undercutting [the country's interests] although he is the only leader of the opposition in the postwar years who always has been kept informed on the handling of these issues.

If it were continued, this tactic of the PASOK chairman would show a degree of consistency in the sense that it would constitute an expression of an entirely different conception of our foreign policy. But recently, and especially during his trips to Bulgaria and Romania, Papandreu took care to change his orientation on basic questions of our foreign policy. Speaking in Sofia, the most loyal ally of the Soviet Union, he emphasized the importance of the mutual limitation of armaments almost repeating the position held by President of the Republic K. Karamanlis, while earlier he avoided offending Moscow and called only for the removal of American missiles from Europe.

Also, last Tuesday, while leaving for Romania he characterized as a positive event the pressure exercised by the Europeans on the Americans during the NATO conference to open talks with the Russians for the limitation of strategic nuclear armaments. At the same time, during both trips he never ceased to praise the Europeans for their contribution to the preservation of detente and for their avoidance of the escalation of a new cold war. Naturally, following these trips Papandreu took care to pay "homage" to President of the Republic K. Karamanlis, bringing him greetings from the presidents of those two countries.

But the essential question is not there. It lies in the fact that these views on the mutual limitation of armaments and for the importance of Europe in maintaining

the detente constitute the basic policy followed by the New Democracy Party in all its successive cabinets. This policy has been the subject of fierce polemics by the PASOK chairman who used Third World rhetoric [in his attacks]. When he said that Europe plays an essential role in the preservation of detente it is clear that this role is being played by the European Community, that is, EEC which was so strongly opposed by Papandreou.

This change of direction by the chairman of PASOK is a positive and constructive element for our country and for our democracy, provided it is completed with the appropriate political garment, that is, with the corresponding views on the same subjects when a problem emerges from other causes as happened the other day on the island of Limnos. Papandreou's criticism reminded one more of his Third World period and "corresponded" very little to his statements during his recent trips.

We do not know yet what induced the PASOK chairman to adopt these views which are so radically different from his previous [views]--because either NATO is clearly cold war inspired, in which case how can one reconcile the views of the Europeans, or the Europeans, too, participate, as happened in the controversial map exercise, in which case they, too, are responsible. We fear, however, that the truth lies somewhere else. Papandreou attacked NATO in order to tone down the effects the statements he made in his latest trips had on his party organization. But the following questions emerge: which is the real viewpoint of the PASOK chairman, or, in other words, is his general change in direction sincere?

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## EDEK, FLN JOINT COMMUNIQUE PUBLISHED

Nicosia TA NEA in Greek 9 May 81 p 7

[Text] At the invitation of the Socialist Party of Cyprus (United Democratic Union of the Center [EDEK]), a delegation of the [Algerian] National Liberation Front [FLN] headed by Seryet Lasarie, member of the Central Committee and chairman of the committee for party relations, visited Cyprus from 3 to 6 May 1981. During its stay here the FLN delegation had a series of talks with an EDEK delegation headed by Vasos Iyssaeridis, member of the party's Politburo. The following participated in the talks [Algerian names transliterated]:

(In the Cyprus side: Takis Khatsidimitriou, secretary general and Politburo member; Andreas Frydas, international secretary and Politburo member; Vias Kenidis, Central Committee and Economic Office member.

(In the Algerian side: Murat Lamouti and Muhmet Utani, both Foreign Relations Committee members.

The talks, conducted in an atmosphere of friendship, struggle solidarity and mutual understanding, dealt with an in-depth analysis of the bilateral relations and the international situation.

## Exchange of Views and Information

The EDEK delegation gave a detailed report on the situation prevailing in Cyprus and on the prospects provided by the forthcoming elections. It also spoke on EDEK's development--its organization and activities domestically and internationally. On its side, the FLN delegation spoke about the most important stages Algeria went through in building a socialist society and the national political institutions under FLN guidance. It also informed the Cypriot delegation about the development of the party, its organization and activities in the domestic and international sectors, especially since its Fourth Congress in 1979.

The two delegations then proceeded with a careful exchange of information on the international situation especially in the Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa. They expressed their concern about the aggravated tension caused by the continuous flows against the rights of people for independence, freedom, progress and peace; about the continued suppressive policy of imperialism and its allies; about the interventions in internal affairs, the efforts for destabilization, the existence

of sources of tensions and crises; and about the reactivation and expansion of the military bases [in Cyprus] and the retrenchment of the imperialist forces of invasion.

#### Solution of the Cyprus Question

In this context, the two delegations strongly condemned the imperialistic maneuvers which are being expanded in the area and whose aim is to change Cyprus into a base of aggression and destabilization against the Arab countries and especially against progressive movements, and into a strategic machine which will allow control of the communications channels and the natural and energy resources of the Arab world. As concerns these matters, the EDEK delegation stated that the Cyprus problem does not lie in a dispute between the two communities of the island--the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot--but in a conflict between imperialism and the people of Cyprus.

The two delegations believe that the solution of the Cyprus question should be based on the implementation of the UN resolutions, the guarantee of the national unity and territorial integrity of the island, the free movement and residence of the Cypriot citizens, the right of the refugees to return to their homes and property, the respect of national sovereignty and the position (or attitude) of the country as a nonaligned state. The two delegations reaffirmed their support of any initiative promoting a just solution of the Cyprus question which will guarantee the independence of the island, the inter-communal harmony, the positive search for missing persons in accordance with UN recommendations, the removal of all foreign troops and the dismantlement of the bases.

#### Mediterranean Peace Area

The two delegations repeat their attachment to the security of the Mediterranean and national independence. They believe that any external intervention is a threat to the peace in the Mediterranean and the whole world. In this respect the two delegations reminded that the security of Europe is inseparable from that of the Mediterranean.

The two delegations expressed their determination to promote any effort capable of strengthening security in the Mediterranean and to support its transformation into an area of peace and cooperation.

Reviewing the situation in the Mediterranean, the two delegations expressed their strong concern about the expansion and aggravation of the tension and its dangerous impact on the independence and freedom of the people in the area as well as on world peace and security. They strongly condemned the Camp David agreements which disregard the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and dangerously perpetuate the Zionist occupation of Arab lands. They reaffirmed their unreserved support of the just struggle of the Palestinian people under PLO leadership and declared that any solution of the Middle East problem necessarily presupposes substantive PLO participation, recognition and implementation of the fundamental national rights of the Palestinian people for creating its own state, the evacuation of all occupied Arab lands including Jerusalem, the right of return of the Palestinian citizens [to their homeland] and respect for their property.

## The Lebanon Question

The two delegations dealt with the developments and aggravation of the situation in Lebanon. They condemned the continuous raids against Lebanon and their increase against the Syrians; they also condemned the imperialist-Zionist maneuvers including those of their agents whose aim is to create conflicts of religious nature and to split Lebanon.

EDEK and FLN reaffirmed their active and steady support of the Lebanese people and all progressive forces in the struggle for ensuring Lebanon's territorial integrity, national unity and sovereignty.

Greatly concerned about the continued war between Iraq and Iran, the delegations believe that this conflict harms the development of both countries and weakens the movement of the nonaligned countries while favoring the strengthening of the imperialist forces in the area. The delegations urgently appeal to both sides to end the hostilities and to seek a fair, peaceful settlement through negotiations. The two delegations condemned the organisation of a rapid development forces which the imperialists aim at using for controlling communications and for their planned intervention for the control of the natural resources and especially the energy resources of the Arab world.

With respect to Africa, the two delegations expressed their deep concern about imperialism's neo-colonialist activities which aim at opposing the struggle of the liberation movements and at harming the stability and the efforts of the African countries for development.

## Liberation Movements

They reaffirmed their support of South Africa's liberation movements and condemned the maneuvers by the western powers and the Pretoria regime to delay the inevitable independence of the Namibian people who are conducting a heroic struggle under the aegis of Swapo, their subject and legal representative. The two delegations reaffirmed their absolute support to the people of South Africa in their struggle under the leadership of ANC, their true and only representative, against the suppression and sovereignty of the white minority.

They also reaffirmed their solidarity struggle to the countries fighting the continued raids of the racist Pretoria regime.

## Peace Is Threatened

Following an analysis of the situation in the Indian Ocean--the massive concentration of arms, the naval fleets and the reinforcement of the military bases and particularly the Diego-Garcia base--EDEK and FLN felt that this situation is a real threat to peace and to the security of the area, as well as to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the neighboring countries. Both sides support Madagascar's initiative to call a summit meeting for the purpose of declaring the Indian Ocean a demilitarised peace zone without atomic weapons.

With regard to the situation in northwestern Africa the two delegations expressed their great concern about the expansionist policy of Morocco and the continuation of the bloody war it imposes on the people of western Sahara. They reaffirmed their determination to combine their efforts for the security of the Democratic Arab Republic (Sahraque Republique Arabe), and the exercise of their legitimate rights for self-determination and independence.

EDEX and FLN reiterate that the solution to the conflict separating the people of the western Sahara in Morocco is to be found in the implementation of the decision-proposals of OUA [expansion unknown], of the UN ad hoc committee and of the nonaligned countries. They invite both sides to start direct negotiations for the purpose of reaching an agreement which will lead to the establishment of peace and security in the area.

The two delegations expressed their strong concern about the maneuvers for destabilization in this area and condemn the repeated threats and raids against the Islamic Republic of Mauritania.

Commenting on the deteriorating conditions in Latin America and especially in El Salvador the two delegations condemned the interventions of imperialism and the actions of dictatorial regimes. They reaffirmed their support to El Salvador's people in their struggle against oligarchy and dictatorship.

As concerns the international situation and its prospects, the delegations believe that nonalignment is a strong independent movement historically positive in changing international political relations and constitutes a proper framework for solving international problems and for ensuring peace and security.

The two delegations agreed to work toward the stabilization of the movement of the nonaligned [countries] because they are convinced that it [movement] is a dynamic factor in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and Zionism and a guarantee of the peoples' rights for freedom and independence. As concerns the international situation the two delegations believe that the weakening of the present economic situation is a result of the crisis the world capitalist system faces, its inability to solve humanity's problems and, particularly, its unwillingness to contribute to the elimination of the various inequities between the industrial and the under-developed countries.

The two delegations favor the coordinated and unified action by the Third World countries to speed up the international negotiations within the UN framework for the establishment of a new, more equitable international economic order and for the restoration and democratization of the international monetary and economic institutions.

Lyssaridis in Algeria

In conclusion, the two delegations noted with satisfaction that their analyses of the current international problems coincided and then reaffirmed their will to do all that is possible to promote and develop a mutual, constructive cooperation between their countries and their [political] parties.

The FLN delegation thanked EDEK for the warm and brotherly reception extended to them and invited ~~EDEK~~ Chairman Vasos Iyssaridis to plan a work and friendship visit to Algeria together with a delegation of his party. The invitation was gladly accepted and the date for the visit will be jointly agreed upon later.

The two parties signed a protocol of friendship and cooperation in various sectors.

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## BERLIN, BEIJING UNIVERSITIES SIGN COOPERATION PACT

West Berlin DER TAGESSPIEGEL in German 16 May 81 p 11

[Report by U.S.: "Cooperation With the Chinese--Free University and Peking University Conclude Agreement"]

[Text] The Berlin Free University (FU) is the first European university to have managed to conclude an agreement about cooperation in instruction and research with the most important Chinese university, the university in Peking. Following the return of a FU delegation including FU President Laemmert, FU Vice President Heckelmann, Sinologist Professor Kuo and the director of the FU Academic Office for External Affairs, Dr Hartwich, DER TAGESSPIEGEL was told by Dr Hartwich that heretofore Peking University had concluded cooperation agreements only with leading U.S. universities such as Harvard, Yale, Columbia and Berkeley, for example. In addition, there is cooperation at the institute level between the Sinologists of Peking University and the Dutch university in Leyden.

The FU cooperation agreement with Peking University for a start provides for an exchange of scholars and researchers in the fields of Sinology and German language, literature, history and culture, but this exchange is to be expanded later to the natural sciences and jurisprudence. And expansion is also possible to sociology and political science, which are in the process of being established as disciplines at Peking University. The cooperation agreed to, not limited as to duration, will begin with Sinology and German language, literature, history and culture, and the emphasis will of course vary. The FU is interested in bringing Chinese lecturers to Berlin and sending PhD and instructor candidates to China in various fields of Sinology-- language, history, politics or economics. Conversely, Peking University is interested above all in having FU professors in German language, literature, history and culture also teach in Peking and in sending budding scholars to the FU for research. In the case of the professors, the period of exchange is 9 or 6 months of a year. It has been agreed that the young scholars will not only be tended to by professors at the host universities but will get access to research materials or travel for research purposes in the country.

Over and above the exchange of scholars, it is however also a question of joint research projects and an exchange of books. Peking University lacks contemporary German literature. During the stay of the FU delegation in Peking, FU President Laemmert therefore presented a book as a token gift in advance of a collection of books of contemporary German literature for which REUTER has donated DM 5,000.



Conversely the FU Sinologists are interested in gaining access to Chinese publications, which are difficult to obtain abroad. Peking University has 7,404 registered students, 145 professors, 269 associate professors and 1,707 instructors and 567 assistants.

The agreement with Peking University came about primarily through the efforts of Chinese Professor Kuo, who has worked at the FU for years and who is known as an expert on the Kuomintang, the first modern Chinese party modeled after the Western pattern. Kuo had therefore been invited by the Chinese Academy to come to China and found out there as early as 1979 about the Chinese interest in cooperation in Sinology and German language, literature, history and culture. The negotiations proper, until the drafting of the agreement, were then conducted by the director of the Office for External Affairs, Dr Hartwich. In 1979 the FU was still considering concluding a cooperation agreement in the medical field with Wuhan University within the framework of developing Chinese contacts by German universities with that university, but Heidelberg stole a march on the FU, and Wuhan also has connections with Essen and the Medical College in Hannover. Though the FU has not abandoned its interest in cooperation in the medical field, priority is now being enjoyed by contacts with Peking University, which occupies an important position in Chinese intellectual and political life.

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## PRESENT LABOR MOVEMENT STATUS ANALYZED

Athens AND1 in Greek 8 May 81 pp 16-19

[Article by And. Sfragidakis: "Retrenchments, Compromises, Adjustments and Firm Governmental Control"]

[Text] Developments at the formal summit of the syndicalist movement--the Greek General Confederation of Labor [GSEE]--are moving rapidly as the time approaches for the parliamentary election which according to common logic and assessment is not expected to be favorable for the New Democracy Party.

In view of this positive prospect for the Greek people--regardless of the more general reservations the people may have on the extent, nature and mode of change or "Change"--the GSEE "leading group" began an effort last year designed to "perpetuate an unacceptable situation and the continuation in GSEE of unacceptable persons" (speech by responsible PASOK syndicalist at the GSEE Congress on 19 April).

These intentions in addition to remaining intentions only revealed the deeper crisis lurking in the ranks of the junta-governmental syndicalism which today shows symptoms of dissipation and clear evidence of a growing factional fight which is not limited only to the syndicalist level but spills over into the areas of government which manipulate the realignments in GSEE.

The political conclusion derived from the results of the [GSEE] Congress in Piraeus is the victory at the syndicalist level of the "hard line" government wing which is engaged in "internal opposition" against the premier's group and which is generally inspired by "pure blood" rightist and, in many ways, even extreme rightist views (Averof, Laskaris and others). The somewhat "strange element" in the political sketching of the recent syndicalist developments is that the government group which opposes GSEE's "democratisation" includes cadres which politically support the premier but essentially differ in ideological points (Evert, Moutsios and others).

These forces, in trying to keep and strengthen their control over GSEE, reacted to the "democratic openings" of this "leading group." And by mobilizing the major part of junta-governmental syndicalism they frustrated [those openings], leaving the "leading group" wavering and distinctly weakened.

## A "Leading Group" Without Support

In the Piraeus Congress, the phenomenon appeared for the first time to have syndicalists who until now supported--openly, even though they conspired behind the scenes all along--the "leading group," speaking openly against it and stating unequivocally that they are not going to support it. The incentive was provided by syndicalists from Northern Greece with old and new professional and "other" relationships with services within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense and who in the past had played a role in undermining the position and options of the "leading group" at a local level (Labor Center in Salonica).

The result of balloting in favor of a simple proportional electoral system was interpreted by many observers as "the beginning of the end" for the GSEE "leading group" which is in danger of playing the role of a "squeezed lemon," if in the meantime the intentions of those who pull the strings for the recent developments do not change toward [the "leading group"], or unless the "leading group" appears before its erstwhile mentors as a "repentant [Mary] Magdalene."

As these columns have already noted (ANDI, Issue 166, 5 December 1980), the "leading group" of GSEE--as those in the group liked to call themselves after it was imposed in 1974 on the GSEE presidium by its heretofore "mentor" minister of labor--had achieved a "turn to the right" following the failure of its effort to gain favor with the Panhellenic Militant Workers Trade Union [PASKE] and to have cadres of the major opposition party join the administration of GSEE (GSEE General Council, 1980); and following the reaction in the highest governmental levels to the "class worries" of GSEE in November (the call for and the realization of a Panhellenic strike).

Nevertheless, the "leading group" has not given up its objective, and with "strange," at first sight, acceptance of the General Council of the PASKE proposals concerning the registration of organizations, the change in the electoral system and the call for a congress, [the "leading group"] has started to create the "practical conditions" which would allow them to survive even in the case of the apparently forthcoming change.

Thus, the syndicalist movement was taken to the extraordinary congress in Piraeus (PASKE proposal) with the objective of submitting on behalf of the GSEE presidium a proposal for a change in the electoral system from majority to simple proportional and a suspension of the charter's provisions to enable organizations of similar occupations to register with GSEE.

The opposition--without any chance for success--submitted more comprehensive proposals which called for the simple proportional at all levels of the movement (union locals, federations, labor centers, GSEE) and the registration of all organizations at all levels of the movement. With the opposition plan (note: in fact, every camp--PASKE, Anti-Dictatorial Labor Front [AELF], United Anti-Dictatorial Labor Movement-Cooperating [ESAK-S]--submitted its own proposal, but the essence of all three is the same) the road for the democratization of the movement truly opened up. But it was precisely for this reason that the plan could attract the votes of those who were to be "harmed" by the restoration of the democratic functions in the syndicalism (editor's note: out of the 750 delegates the opposition did not have more than 110).

Under the circumstances the only proposal with any chance of being approved was that of the GSEE presidium which, however, in spite of its "democratic veneer" did not give any genuine solution to the problem of representation and democratic functioning of the movement. This was because it limited the simple proportional and the possibility of registrations only at the GSEE level.

This means that with its October congress GSEE would acquire a seemingly democratic mask--with the representation in its administration of all ideological trends as occurred at the 1978 congress in Kavala which applied the simple proportional--but without being truly representative because the local conferences would apply the majority system while hundreds of organizations were left out of federations and labor centers.

This development would provide the GSEE "leading group" with the ability to choose its "allies" and "supporters" depending on the results of the parliamentary election and according to the interests, needs and expediencies of the parties which currently fight for power and which, understandably, have as one of their immediate targets the keeping--or gaining--control over GSEE.

But the rejection of the simple proportional following the "internal coup" in the ranks of the junta-governmental syndicalism complicated the situation, at least for the GSEE "leading group" which believed that the change in the electoral system would assure its "syndicalist future."

The first real "test" for the syndicalist future of the "leading group" and especially of the GSEE chairman, following his almost personal "defeat" in the GSEE extraordinary congress, will come at the Athens Labor Center Conference (21-22 June) which he will also chair thanks to the "ex officio" placement of the "leadership" in 1974 under the Laskaris "democratization" measures and the electoral practices which followed (congresses with dozens of real unions excluded from the Athens Labor Center) and with dozens of "union-phantoms" whose existence is discovered only whenever the "syndicalist court" of the Ministry of Labor needs an electoral "reaffirmation." The present administration of the Athens Labor Center as well as the majority of the delegates who will assume the "duty" of "electing" the new "leadership" of the center are controlled by those politico-syndicalist forces with which Karakitsos is currently in conflict (juntists, extreme rightists, "hard line," pro-government persons). Of course, these same forces have supported until now the "Karakitsos hegemony" both in the Athens Labor Center and in GSEE but following the recent developments the situation has changed a great deal and the new climate threatens to push aside the "moderate" group of the present governmental syndicalism.

This group does not seem to control now--at least not as much as previously--the electoral "base" of the congress which in its majority has ceased to take its "line" from Karakitsos and has reoriented itself rather definitely toward the more "healthy" political forces which play an active role in the syndicalist movement. Given this given, the "Karakitsos group" will find it very difficult to keep its "omnipotence" and if it wants to stay even formally at the syndicalist forefront will find it necessary to enter into compromises which will limit significantly its possibilities or probabilities for "disrespect" toward the minister of labor, the "mentor" of the "healthy" syndicalist movement.



The new congress of the Athens Labor Center [EKA] will not be much different from its predecessors, both those before the dictatorship and those after the "restoration of democracy." Dozens of real, active, mass and especially existing unions are excluded while on the other side dozens of "seals" have been assigned by the government and the employers the "duty" of "representing" the worker-employee class of Athens and to vote each time for those who are "chosen" by the minister of labor.

#### Sp. Tsandis: A Sly Juntist

This means that taking into account the fact that the electoral system is majoritarian the possibilities for an effective electoral intervention by the opposition, even in the event it unites for the contest, are very limited. The EKA Congress will be by necessity an "internal affair" of the junta-governmental syndicalism to settle accounts and distribute the "spoils" represented by the drachma-bearing syndicalist "offices."

The "closing of the ranks" of juntists and extreme rightist governmental syndicalists at the EKA level has been effected around S. Tsandis, the EKA chairman during the dictatorship (and a founding member of the infamous Greek Cultural Movement [EPOK] and a syndicalist of the center-left before the junta period) who was succeeded by Karakitsos in 1974 with the "de-juntization" of the syndicalist movement.

This "star" of the (neo-democratic) syndicalist pantheon is characterized by the "eloquence" and also the "adaptability" of his speeches and writings: main speaker in the gathering organized on 2 June 1973 by GSEE and EKA in Omonoia Square to "celebrate" the proclamation of a "republic" by [dictator] Papadopoulos, when he expressed his...gratitude because..."the rise of the Armed Forces on 21 April 1967 had averted the certain slide of the nation toward chaos" and "looked with confidence" to the "course charted by the president of the republic, Georgios Papadopoulos..." In his opening remarks Sp. Tsandis expressed his satisfaction(!) because "democracy is returning to its natural birthplace..."

On 24 July 1974--[the day] better known as "metapoliteusis"--Tsandis in an EKA proclamation said that [EKA] "greet[s] with enthusiasm and joy the fact that the country is entering the phase for the restoration of normal democratic life..." and "expects that the winds of freedom and of democratic developments will be life-giving and renovating" and "places the national forces of the worker-employee class in motion for the restoration of the normal democratic life in the country..."

This syndicalist, taking advantage of his "nationalist credentials," was able to gain valuable access to the government and after a certain point in time started to "demand" from his ministerial "mentors" that he be "fully utilized" in the syndicalist area. (In the meantime) he took care to keep his syndicalist identity by becoming...a salesman--a member of the "Makri-juntist" anti-association which belongs to EKA--while during the period of his "omnipotence" under the junta he was a municipal employee and syndicalist from this area... For reasons of "justice" we must note that the syndicalist identity of the present EKA chairman is similar. Dismissed by the junta as an employee--and syndicalist--of a pension fund, he was employed by GSEE following the fall of the dictatorship. In those positions he was "elected" by the controlled congresses without having even



formally the syndicalist identity until recently when for reasons of "caution" he created a union of electronic medical machines(!) (portraying himself as its president).

To increase his "bargaining power" each time he organized on the eve of each EKA Congress a "syndicalist camp" and in this way "pressed" the government and its syndicalist representatives to "utilize" him, but without success because in those periods Karakitsos was all-powerful in the area of junta-governmental syndicalism and was able every time to weaken him [Tsandis] by taking away his followers (EKA delegates) and to keep him on the sidelines, probably because he saw in him early a potential "enemy" and possible successor.

On the eve of the most recent EKA congress (January, 1979) when the junta-governmental syndicalism with its well-known electoral maneuvers had achieved a "great victory" at the expense of the then united opposition, Tsandis had access as far up as the present premier (G. Rallis), a "mentor" from 1974 until 1980 of many juntist syndicalists who found in him a "sanctuary" against the Laskaris persecution, not because they were juntist but because they had not declared "obedience" to him.

It appeared for a moment that the "step" was going to achieve the "desired" result because today's premier gave orders to the "formal" partisan syndicalist machinery (the Worker-Employees Committee of the New Democracy Executive Committee and the Syndicalist Bureau) to "take care" of Tsandis and to push him toward the all-powerful Karakitsos.

The "arrangement" in the end fell through because Tsandis wanted to join the EKA administration with his "group" while Karakitsos "offered" him his election as an individual. Tsandis threatened at that time to enter the election with his own ticket which could break up the "unity" of the junta-governmental syndicalism and would cause, as a result of the breakup, the "risk" of an opposition victory. The Tsandis appearance as a "leader" at the congress did not have any aftereffect because in the meantime Karakitsos had been able to weaken him by convincing the government that the presence of Tsandis had "no purpose" and was "dangerous." In the end Tsandis did not run in the election in which, however, several of his friends survived and today are members of the EKA administration.

Now, however, Tsandis is threatening to take "revanche" from Karakitsos, taking advantage of his downfall on the political (governmental) and syndicalist level and by "playing the card" of the "hard line" governmental wing which in the face of the possible loss of power and a PASOK victory wants to "buttress" and "safeguard" the syndicalist movement to use it for undermining the "government of change."

In the initial phase, however, a certain group from the political-syndicalist forces which now oppose Karakitsos has not yet "crossed" him out of the EKA Congress and only wants to "put him in his place" and use the "bait of office" to keep him under their control during the next political period. With this in mind, these forces "support" and nurture the "Tsandis campaign" not so much to use it to replace Karakitsos as to "blackmail" him and to press him with the dilemma either to remain their organ or to withdraw from the syndicalist stage either "peacefully" by a timely and "voluntary" resignation or forcibly through an electoral defeat.

Khr. Karakitsos: "The Soft Line"

The "warning" was given already at the extraordinary GSEE Congress and Karakitsos apparently "got the message" even before the critical ballot for the simple proportional, stating that his future presence in syndicalism will depend on the result of the voting.

The disapproval of the [Karakitsos'] proposal on the proportional by the great mass of junta-governmental syndicalists coupled with the aforementioned statement has already created a problem as to whether Karakitsos following the Piraeus Congress tried to dispel the impressions created (e.g., "the result of the voting shows the existing democracy among those who support the GSEE administration") and to "weaken" the significance of his statement on the possibility of his withdrawal if his proposal for a simple proportional was not "passed" (e.g., "there is no problem since the proposal was supported by the majority of those who favor the GSEE administration").

It is evident that in the period until the EKA Congress--and primarily the GSEE Congress (October)--the orgy of behind-the-scenes horse-trading will go on in the ranks of junta-governmental syndicalism and the "battle of factions" will reach another peak in order to have "new forces" prevail or the old forces survive. The "new forces" which hope to climb to the GSEE presidency include cadres already in the GSEE administration since the Kalamata "Congress" in which, as is known, Karakitsos tried to entrap the opposition--offering to the opposition "safe" posts in the new administration--only to be ensnared in the end himself by the juntist wing of the state syndicalism which not only took over the posts "projected" for the opposition, but essentially gained a majority in the administration (this majority at the GSEE level was temporarily overturned in favor of Karakitsos by increasing the administration members from 35 to 45 in the GSEE General Council last October, and by the entry of persons having his almost absolute confidence).

When following the General Council--and the temporary victory, as it turned out, of the Karakitsos line"--the countdown started for the present GSEE chairman, the "new forces" moved their positions forward relying on the total support of the "hard line" government wing. (Editor's note: The term "new forces" does not mean that the members are new and "uncorrupted." On the contrary, they come either from the pre-junta Makri-Theodoriko establishment or from the juntist syndicalist creation and are flagrant cases of reactionary and "sinister" syndicalists. The term "new" means that they tend to become the "national solution" at the highest GSEE level as it is constituted under the new democracy in the organization-federations and the juntist [labor] centers where they are in charge.)

The promotion of those forces started in November with their entry into the GSEE Executive Committee and the assumption of seven out of the nine secretarial posts in the GSEE administration and was completed in that phase by the assumption of the GSEE general secretariat.

Bluebloods: "A Hard Line"

The juntist syndicalists are not completely integrated into the wider "governmental syndicalism" in which they constitute its "nationally pure" wing.

Their integration came about gradually after the first GSEE Congress (Kavala, 1976) when the juntist camp ran separately (on the ticket of "Free Democratic Labor Movement"-EDEK) and elected 3 board members in the GSEE administration (compared to 16 by the government group and the "repentant" juntists, and 11 for the three-sided opposition). At the Kalamata Congress (November, 1978) the government and the juntist bloc ran on a single ticket because in the meantime these two groups of "nationally-minded" syndicalism had almost completely joined forces with regard to the objectives and methods of the "alliance." The only difference between the two "partners"--the government group and the juntists--was the distribution and exploitation of the GSEE leading posts.

The "hard-line" wing had questioned at that time the right of the minister of labor to regulate the syndicalist affairs in keeping with the interests of his old friends in the Democratic Workers Movement of Greece (EDEK)--a camp formed during the dictatorship by centrist and rightist syndicalists under the leadership of Laskaris to express their opposition to the syndicalism of the junta--but today it has secured his support and acts "in opposition" to the GSEE "leading group" and competes with them to win over the favor and support of governmental personalities and mechanisms.

The juntist "core" (which on occasion, and depending on "tradeoffs," secures a majority in the GSEE administration) looks forward on a long-term basis to taking over leading posts in the GSEE in the context of the more general "hardening" of the government's policy, and generally accuses the GSEE "leading group" of not being "sufficiently nationally-minded," of "tolerating" the left, and of "conspiring" behind the scenes to assure its survival even after the government change.

The juntists today do not have an organized syndicalist camp as have the other basic forces in the syndicalist sector. They are active at the level of cadres who, formally as "syndicalist leadership," control basic areas of the movement especially at the level of provincial labor centers but also of "vital" federations.

This "core" meets often and charts its policy which, however, is not yet expressed in the form of a formal movement to overturn the "leading group" but limits itself to "warnings" and "pressures" and to "explosions of nationalists" and anti-communist fervor waiting for the green, or rather the blue, light from the minister of labor.

The basic strength of the remnants of juntist syndicalism--which currently does not seem to have any political connection and cooperation with the partisan descendants of the dictatorship--is located in the locals which, as is known, have the same juntist administrations which were not affected by the legislative "purge" after the fall of the dictatorship. Control over these locals was kept even during the (new) democracy while at the level of federations and labor centers the presence of the juntists was felt until 1976 when it was "incorporated" in the wider governmental syndicalism.

## The Next Congress: A Routine Affair

The victory of these forces is largely due to the structure of the syndicalist movement and to the effects of the abnormal and anti-democratic pre-junta regime. During that period the unions controlled by the Left had been expelled and replaced by "anti-associations." The dictatorship dissolved the leftist unions while the "nationally-minded" unions were allowed to continue and to "improve" their "national activity." Virtually nothing changed after the fall of the dictatorship: the dissolved union locals were kept out of the labor centers and the federations while the "representation" of the workers remained in the hands of the juntists. The congresses of federations and labor centers were held under this regime and "naturally" the junta-governmental syndicalism won. This year, too, the congresses will be held under the same regime, which means that the OSCE Congress in October will be simply a routine repetition both in terms of content and level and in terms of the voting results (the second applies only to the opposition which as a result of the majoritarian electoral system has no chance). Under the circumstances, the interest in the election is limited to the "distribution" of posts between the two wings of the junta-governmental syndicalism.

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